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ABSTRACT
The present EU budget is inconsistent with the current state and future prospects
of European integration. Three failures are most evident: first, spending is
heavily tilted towards the support of a declining sector, agriculture; second, it is
almost impossible to reallocate spending across time and across policies; and
third, its size is unrelated with the goals of the Union. Transforming the
Community budget into a means through which the economic policy of the
Union is consistently defined and put into practice requires correcting these
failures. This can be done by moving towards a fully fledged “European
Budgetary System” in which the EU and national budgets pursue, in a co-
ordinated manner, commonly-agreed objectives set in the Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines. On a multi-annual basis, the EU Financial Perspectives and
the national Stability and Convergence Programmes would be set within an
aggregate European Budgetary Programme. Annually, this should give rise to a
EU Budget Law to be approved alongside national budget laws.
JEL Classification: E61, E62, H5, H6, H77
Keywords: European Union, Fiscal Policy, EU budget, Fiscal Federalism
1.  INTRODUCTION(*)
As it stands today, the EU budget is an historical relic. Three failures are most
evident. First, its spending composition is heavily tilted towards the support of a
declining sector, agriculture; second, it is almost impossible to reallocate
spending across time and across policies to reflect economic and political
priorities; and third, its size bears no comparison to any of the budgets of EU
countries and it is unrelated with the EU goals.
First, in terms of composition, the current EU budget still largely reflects
a double deal: the EC-6’s Common Market and the Single Act of 1985. The first
deal entailed a large share of Community expenditure devoted to the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) as a price to be paid for allowing Germany’s
industrial products to enter the French market. The second deal saw the rise of
spending on cohesion and regional policies in the context of the Iberian
enlargement as the price to be paid for compensating the possible losers of the
1992 Single Market project. Those two policies together represent some 85% of
the EU budget. The remaining 15% is divided between third countries’ policies
(essentially development aid and growth-enhancing assistance), internal
allocative policies (such as research, Trans-European networks, etc) and
administrative expenditure. The EU does not finance a EU-wide welfare system
and thus plays no role in explicit interpersonal redistribution. However, the
CAP, which originally represented much of the allocative function of the EU
budget, by moving away from price support towards direct aid, increasingly
contributes interpersonal redistribution. Equally the EU budget has no role in
macroeconomic stabilisation.
Second, the EU budget displays a degree of rigidity far exceeding that of
national budgets both across time1 and across budgetary headings. Both in the
multi-annual programming and in the annual budgetary procedure, the transfer
of money across budgetary headings is subject to cumbersome procedures,
largely exceeding those at the national level.
Third, given its small size (1.05% of GDP in 2003), the EU budget has
practically no macroeconomic relevance. National budgets, measured as the
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1 Article 269 TEC constraints the EU budget to equilibrium in each and every budgetary year.
2average of public spending, amounted in 2002 to 48% of GDP in the euro area
and 47% of GDP in the EU as a whole. The smallest national budget – that of
Ireland – is almost 36% of GDP. Moreover, the maximum size (1.27% of EU
GNP) of the EU budget is predetermined by a 1992 political agreement
confirmed in 1999 and has no relation with goals and objectives of the EU.
While highlighting these three failures, we do not deny two positive
features of the EU budget compared to national budgets, namely simplicity and
transparency. Nevertheless it is increasingly evident that the current EU budget
is inconsistent with the present state and future prospects of European
integration. While its historical and political roots are deep, the EU budget does
not stand up to economic and political scrutiny: no federation (mature or not)
around the world has a budget whose dominant share is devoted to supporting a
declining sector, does not provide public goods typically featuring large
economies of scale, and does not supply any stabilisation in case of idiosyncratic
disturbances.
Starting from this initial assessment, two alternative approaches are
possible. Either, one considers that the current EU budget is a “political
equilibrium” whereby money is transferred across countries according to the
logic of the juste retour.2 Hence, any adjustment to the Budget can only be at the
margin. Or, as we do in this paper, one considers that the added value generated
by EU expenditure should prime on the issue of “who pays what” and therefore
even a radical change of the functions of the EU budget is possible (and indeed
desirable).
How can the weaknesses of the present budgetary arrangements be
tackled? We propose to establish a vertical coordination between national and
EU budgets by moving towards a European Budgetary System in which both the
national and the EU budget “play together”. At present, there is no coordination
between the EU and national budgets, either on the spending or on the revenue
side. The issue of coordination between EU and national budgets is an area left
largely unexplored by the economic literature.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2, after a bird-eye view of the
theory of multi-level finance, presents a conceptual framework for the vertical
                                                         
2 In the EU jargon, the juste retour (or the net balance) approach is the issue of “who pays
what”. This approach epitomised by the famous Margaret Thatcher’s sentence “I want my
money back”, consists in a rather crude calculation of the accounting difference between
estimated payments from and expenditure to any given Member States of the EU. Economic
added value generated by the EU expenditure, externalities of the EU expenditure and
revenues (which by definition are very large), the economic significance and reliability of the
accounting evidence are totally disregarded by the net balance approach.
3
coordination between the EU and the national budgets. Section 3 identifies the
areas where EU finances should be re-oriented. Section 4 deals with the issue of
flexibility in the EU budget. The following two sections tackle the issue of
coordination between the EU budget and the national budgets. Section 5 put
forward the idea of a European Budgetary System, the main proposal of the
paper. Section 6 spells out how it could work in practice. Section 7 concludes.
2. RE-THINKING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EU BUDGET
2.1 The old and new theory of multi-level public finance: a bird’s-eye view
Thinking of the future EU budgetary system raises the issue of the allocation of
competencies between the Community and the Member States. The classic
theory of fiscal federalism and new political economy of multi-level government
set a number of criteria for deciding how to allocate competencies between the
central EU level and Member States.
Classic fiscal federalism emphasises the need to:
 i. Internalise externalities: if the positive effects of programmes on economic
actors other than those financing them are not internalised, free riding will
lead to an under-supply of such programmes;
 ii. Avoid internalities: prevent beneficiaries of spending programmes from
shifting their financing onto agents (usually taxpayers in the same or in
other jurisdictions) who do not benefit from those programmes;
 iii. Exploit economies of scale: increase in efficiency of supply arising from
declining costs of production;
 iv. Attain minimum size: small countries or jurisdictions do not attain the
critical mass to provide the minimum amount of certain types of public
goods;
 v. Take into account heterogeneity of preferences: when preferences between
jurisdictions are heterogeneous, a decentralised provision of public goods is
superior when compared with a uniform supply at the central level.
While fiscal federalism focuses on competencies, a parallel can be drawn
between these and spending allocations.3 The theory implies that the functions
of two of the three of Musgraves’ branches of government – that is income
redistribution and cyclical stabilisation – should be carried out at a sufficiently
high level of government. In the public finance area, the allocation function
                                                         
3 Clearly, the relation between competencies and spending is complex. Competencies
allocated to the EU, disregarding whether exclusive or shared, may generate four types of
spending: 1) only EU spending (e.g. CAP); 2) EU and national spending (e.g. Structural
actions); 3) only national spending (e.g. environmental regulation); 4) no spending at all (e.g.
competition policies).
4deals with the provision of public goods either as pure public goods (non-rival
and non-excludible), quasi-collective goods or merit goods (Moesen, 2002).
As shown by Alesina et al. (2001, 2003), there exists a trade off between
the benefits of scale and the costs of heterogeneity: the EU should focus on
policy areas where economies of scale and externalities are large, and delegate
to national or lower-level governments the policy areas where heterogeneity of
preferences is predominant relative to the benefits of scale.
Classic fiscal federalism is built on the assumption of a benevolent social
planner. The new theory of fiscal federalism encompasses the political economy
of the decision making process (see, e.g. Persson et al., 1996, Tabellini, 2003).
Three aspects are stressed. First, second-best considerations related to
constraints in policy formation imply that the provision of a public good, at a
level different from the optimal one, in the absence of such constraints, can still
be welfare enhancing. Second, in order to foster political acceptability of
provision of a certain programme, it is necessary to compensate the losers. For
instance, “giving something to everybody” may be inefficient (by entailing
“transfers churning”), but may enhance the political acceptability of
redistribution.4 Third, the fiscal federalism literature largely ignores decision-
making costs (ex ante) and frustration costs (ex post) which are typical of large
and heterogeneous groups.5 The existence of such costs implies that the EU level
should focus on medium-term or time-invariant priorities which do not require
frequent re-negotiations (see section 5).
Fiscal federalism, however, even if supplemented with the new political
economy approach, does not encompass the EU political dimension of
subsidiarity and proportionality enshrined in Article 5 TEU6: unless there is a
clear case for carrying out a project at EU level, subsidiarity considerations
                                                         
4 This applies also at the national level to the welfare state where the willingness of relatively
well-off income earners to finance the social programmes has been eased by the fact that they
themselves benefited from such programmes. See, Buti, Franco and Pench (1999).
5 See Teutemann (1992). A possible political reaction could be the shift, in the case of certain
public goods to clubs within the EU, making use of the “reinforced cooperation” procedure
foreseen in the Nice Treaty.
6 “The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty
and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the member States and can therefore, by reason of scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.”
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would plead in favour of financing the project at national level. The burden of
proof should be with the higher level.
2.2 A conceptual framework for vertical co-ordination
At present, the EU and national budgets are almost completely separated. EU
spending is practically fixed both in terms of size and composition, with its
ceiling and structure set every seven years in the so-called Financial
Perspectives. National budget priorities are set largely disregarding EU
programmes, with the exceptions of agriculture and cohesion where EU
intervention is sizeable. However, considerations on the relative effectiveness of
EU and national spending are largely absent in determining how to carry out
public policies. This is a source of inefficiency as it leads to lower-than-
desirable provisions of public goods or higher-than-needed overall public
spending.
For expository convenience, it is useful to think of any policy as a public
good7, Y, which is being produced through two inputs, national spending, GN,
and EU spending, GEU8:
(1) Y= f(GN,GEU)
GN and GEU are characterised by a specific productivity,  and ,
respectively.  and  should be seen as technical coefficients, reflecting the first
four criteria (i. to iv.) identified in the section above.
The overall public spending plays the role of budget constraint and is indicated
by G:
(2) G = GN + GEU
However, in the case of some public goods (defence, redistribution)
heterogeneity of preferences (criterion v. in the section above) may translate into
a capping to the politically feasible amount of EU expenditure.
(3) GEU ≤ Ĝ , where Ĝ ≥ 0.
This capping, which can be greater than or equal to zero depending on the
heterogeneity of preferences, would introduce a kink in the linear formulation of
equation (2), and would make the budget horizontal at the level of GEU = Ĝ.
                                                         
7 This applies naturally to the allocation function of public spending, but also equity and
stabilisation can be thought of as a public goods supplied by the national and the EU level.
Clearly, in the case of equity, cross-country redistribution can only be carried out at supra-
national level.
8 For simplicity, in what follows GN and GEU are treated as a single value. However GN should
be thought of as a matrix (the spending items per line and the countries per column) and GEU
as a vector.
6Figures 1, 2 and 3 give a graphical representation of the model. The
existing distribution of spending between the national and the EU level (E in all
figures) most likely reflects current political and institutional constraints. E is
clearly a sub-optimal position. Under no-capping, an optimising benevolent
policy maker, controlling both GN and GEU would, given the total amount of
resources, choose the sharing of the production between national and EU level
of expenditure that maximises the production of public goods, or, for a desired
level of output, choose the optimal sharing of spending between the EU and the
national level that allows to minimise G. The sharing will be determined by the
form of the production function f(.), different productivity of the national and
the EU expenditure and the form and the level of the budget constraint9.
In Figure 1, we assume . An optimal allocation of spending between
the EU and national budgets implies moving from E (reflecting the existing
allocation between EU and national budgets) to either EI (maximum Y) or EII
(minimum G).
Figure 1: Higher productivity of national spending, 
                                                         
9 Equation (2) implies a 45-degree budget constraint. However the expression could be
generalised by attaching to GN GEU their specific “prices” which would capture the distortions
due to taxation. Today, the EU Budget is mostly financed by national contributions, which are
financed by national taxes: the financing of GN and GEU generates, therefore, the same
distorsion. In the future, if the EU budget were to be financed by a particular subset of
national taxes, the distorsions generated by the two sets of taxes (and hence the coefficients of
GN and GEU in (2)) could be different, thereby changing the slope ot the budget constraint.
While this would affect the location of the optimal point, the qualitative conclusions of our
analysis do not change. We are indebted to Wilhelm Kohler for this intuition.
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The opposite holds in Figure 2 where . Hence, Y would be maximised for a
given level of total spending if much of the financing would take place at the
Union level.10
Figure 2: Higher productivity of EU spending, 
                                                         
10 While in Figures 1 and 2, we have an internal solution (i.e. a certain public good is
produced optimally by a combination of EU and national spending), it cannot be excluded that
efficiency is optimised by allocating spending on a certain public good totally at the EU or at
the national level. This must be the case for a host of public services of purely national or
local interest, see next section.
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8Figure 3: Constrained preference on EU spending, 
Figure 3 depicts the case where EU spending is more productive than national
spending, but there is a ceiling on its amount (equation 3). It means that for a
particular policy the feasible amount of GEU is constrained by heterogeneity of
preferences, and therefore trespassing that level of EU expenditure proves
politically unfeasible. Therefore, as the figure shows, the unconstrained
optimum (EI) cannot achieved. Nonetheless, equilibrium EII is still preferable to
the initial distribution of spending between the two levels of government.
In the three figures, jumping directly from the current sharing of spending
to the (unconstrained or constrained) optimal sharing may prove unfeasible. In
particular, the decision-making process as well as rivalries between institutions
and levels of governance may hinder reaching the first best solution.
Nonetheless, a gradual move towards the optimal composition of spending
would still improve efficiency.
In essence, in order to reform public spending in the EU economy, one
has to pass a judgement on the desired level of output, Y*, on what type of
production function is relevant for the production of any given public good11, on
                                                         
11 For instance, a linear production function associated with a linear budget constraint will
deliver only corner solutions: that is policies which ought to be run totally either at the
national level or at the EU level depending on which level the productivity is the greatest. In
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the relative value of  and  and on the possible political ceiling of EU
spending, Ĝ. As we will argue below, a EU budgetary system should
complement such an assessment with an overall budget constraint, G*, thereby
overcoming separate, and by definition sub-optimal, constraints on GN and GEU.
This amounts to saying that the optimal amount of GN and GEU is endogenously
determined and not set a priori.
3. WHAT SHOULD THE EU BUDGET DO?
3.1 Re-orienting EU spending
Even to the layman, it is apparent that the current EU budget hardly conforms to
the normative implications of the theory of fiscal federalism, even taking into
account the political economy constraints stressed by the most recent literature.
As we argued in the introduction, the EU has a small central budget which
is neither adequate in terms of composition to the new stage of economic and
political integration, nor sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing circumstances
and political priorities. Clearly, path dependency matters: it would be politically
ingenuous to attempt to redesign the EU budget from scratch. Nonetheless, the
contradictions of the current budget and, more broadly, the public finance
arrangements within the EU (Community and Member States’ budgets) are
becoming increasingly apparent as integration deepens amongst a subset of
countries (those sharing monetary sovereignty) in a Union that, with
enlargement, becomes more heterogeneous.
The discussion below is organised around the three Musgravian branches
of government: allocation, redistribution and stabilisation.12
Allocation
New EU public goods. In the enlarged Europe, defence, internal security and
external aid will have to be increasingly supplied at the central level. These are
textbook examples of public goods to be provided centrally. Protection against
organised crime and terrorism, border patrols, immigration policy, and aid to
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of spending allocation between the national and the EU level and we also take into account
institutional or political constraints
12 The scope of the following discussion (and of the paper in general) is not to determine the
values of  and  for any type of policy, but rather to show how competencies could be
reorganised on the basis of the implicit values of  and  which have emerged from the most
recent literature on fiscal federalism. Several of the issues discussed in this section were
already dealt with at the beginning of the 1990s in the report Stable Money, Sound Finances,
see European Commission (1993).
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third countries are characterised by large economies of scale, strong
externalities, relatively homogeneous preferences, the need to attain a minimum
size and the risk of free riding. Moreover, as stressed by Tabellini (2003) and
Berglöf et al. (2003), coordinating national policies is not enough as all these
areas concern the executive power of governments and are executed by specific
bureaucracies. Central provisioning will also strengthen the bargaining position
of Europe on the world scene.
As to defence, several of the above criteria apply, but heterogeneity of
preferences (e.g., political neutrality) persists. In the past, provisioning at the EU
level has encountered political resistance, explained by the fact that centralised
supply implies “delegation” from national to European policymaking bodies of
the authority to decide over “sovereign-sensitive” goods (Persson et al., 1996).
This has imposed a close to zero capping to the defence expenditure made at the
EU level. To the extent that the EU moves towards political union, such
reluctance should gradually be overcome. A solution could be to focus EU
provisioning onto the relatively less controversial aspects of these policies (e.g.
in defence, start with the Rapid Reaction Force) and dissociate direct
participation from financing (all EU members would contribute to the financing
via the EU budget, but the countries encountering political opposition would not
be directly involved in execution).
Growth-enhancing expenditures. The EU liberalisation initiatives of the last
decade have not translated into higher growth. The so-called Lisbon strategy, set
out by the Lisbon European Council in Spring 2000, is set to transform the static
efficiency gains of the Single Market into dynamic efficiency gains. Several of
the components of the strategy do not have budgetary implications or, when they
do, are to be carried out at the national level. Nonetheless, some growth-
enhancing policies with large externalities could be carried out at the EU level.
Examples of these are major R&D and innovation programmes and Trans-
European Networks, especially along East-West axes.
Other internal policies. A larger heterogeneity of preferences in a wider Europe
entails a strict application of the “subsidiarity test”. Several existing spending
programmes under the Internal Policies category do not pass this test. Future EU
activities could focus on fostering citizens’ Europe. Increased mobility across
countries could be promoted by setting goals in education and language
proficiency coupled with EU financing of minimum standards (von Hagen,
2002)13.
                                                         
13 As pointed out by von Hagen (2002), increasing mobility could be also seen as a way of
lessening the costs of EMU.
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Common Agricultural Policy14. The reduction in agricultural spending is the
conditio sine qua non to claim a stronger role of the EU budget in other, more
suitable areas. The CAP hardly complies with any of the criteria identified in
Section 2 and can actually be taken as an example of optimisation of
internalities with perverse redistribution effects. The shift away from price
support towards direct aid (supporting farmers’ revenue) needs to continue.
However, direct aids amount to interpersonal redistribution of a specific class of
citizens (workers in the agricultural sector): there is no justification to carry out
these kinds of transfers via the EU budget. The need to sharply reduce the share
of the EU budget devoted to agriculture to make room for other priorities has
long been recognised (e.g. Padoa-Schioppa, 1987). Boldness requires going
beyond a very mild erosion of the CAP share in the budget – as decided in the
Brussels European Council in October 2002 - and addressing head-on the issue
of a radical reform of the CAP, including its partial re-nationalisation (at least of
direct aids).
Redistribution
Fiscal federalism suggests that income redistribution should be carried out at a
sufficiently high level of government. Income redistribution can be done both
across individuals of a given country and across countries. So far, the bulk of
EU involvement in redistribution has concentrated on income redistribution
across countries. The interpersonal dimension, which is at the basis of the
welfare state and the European Social Model has, up to now, remained within
the remit of national governments. Interesting proposals for a direct EU
involvement in interpersonal redistribution have been made. However, albeit the
idea of a EU-wide minimum social safety net has its merits,15 political and
feasibility constraints will most likely limit the main goal of the EU
redistribution to policies for regional or national convergence. This is consistent
with the theory of fiscal federalism, with the heterogeneity of preferences
towards redistribution and with the different information constraints faced by the
EU and the national level. Indeed, “the Community […] is not well suited to
executing distributive policies at the level of individual persons or small
enterprises. Efficient income distribution requires detailed administration at the
level of the individual, and coherence with features of income tax and social
security systems, and the Community cannot assure this” (Padoa-Schioppa,
1987: 133).
                                                         
14 The nature of CAP as an allocative or redistributive policy is much disputed (see Nava
2000). As a redistributive policy, one of the many reasons why the CAP is widely criticised is
due to the fact that its redistribution function depends more upon the work title (e.g. producer
of a given product) and it is positively correlated with the potential income of the beneficiary.
15 See, Bertola (1999), Bertola et al. (2000), and Boeri and Terrell (2002).
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The current design and implementation of the EU cohesion policy is such
EU transfers are very diffused across the EU territory. At present, all EU
countries receive funds under the EU cohesion policy and only Luxembourg and
Denmark (and Belgium and Netherlands from 2007) do not have at least one
region assisted by the so-called Objective 1 intervention16.
In order to make the EU cohesion policy more effective, we argue in
favour of redesigning EU cohesion policy. Funds should focus on (a) fostering
income convergence of poorer countries, and (b) reducing the social costs of
factor reallocation. Hence, conceptually, one could therefore imagine that
cohesion policy is implemented via two different funds, responding to the two
needs of convergence and restructuring: “Convergence Aid” funds devoted to
helping backward countries and regions to catch up with richer countries; and
“Restructuring Aid” funds which are intended to facilitate the resource
reallocation for those entities affected by shocks of exogenous nature (e.g.
technological change, globalisation, enlargement).
Convergence Aid funds are intended as pure convergence policy in favour of
less prosperous countries and should be used for two purposes: institution
building and growth-enhancing expenditure (such as R&D, education and
training, infrastructure, etc.). In order to be able to spend money, efficiently, for
growth-enhancing expenditure, a country needs a very efficient legal and
administrative system in place. Building legal and administrative capacity is a
top priority in any cohesion strategy across the EU, because of the contribution
to growth that a high quality administrative and legal system makes. Several
empirical studies show a positive correlation between income convergence in
Europe and standard indicators of quality of administration quality of
administration.17 Institution-building is particularly important for the new EU
Member States.
Restructuring Aid funds should be available to those entities, in any country,
affected by structural adjustment. Since resource reallocation affects people in
different geographical locations and belonging to different industrial sectors,
entities could be defined either as sectors or as territorial units or as the
combination of both (given sectors in given places). Restructuring funds may
                                                         
16 Objective 1 regions are those where residents have a per-capita income of less than 75% of
Community average. This is the result, inter alia, of the predominant regional focus of EU
cohesion expenditure and of cohesion negotiations driven by net balance considerations. Net
balance considerations find their natural humus in the EU cohesion policy, because the
Council needs unanimity to agree on this policy, which gives to each and every country a de
facto veto. National political constraints make that each country worries more about being
able to flag “a negotiation success” than about being sure that funds are spent in those policies
having a higher Community added value.
17 See, e.g. Mairate and Hall (2000) and Hallet (2002).
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also play a stabilisation role to the extent that since it is very likely that shocks
are uncorrelated across countries, regions and sectors.
A new design for the EU cohesion policy would help addressing two
directions for reform that are central to the ongoing debate on the future of EU
cohesion policy: a) geographical focus, and b) earmarking of EU funds.
As for the first issue, several arguments have been put forward in the
literature in favour of a shift from the current regional focus towards a country
focus. First, efficiency may better be obtained by allocating money at country
level and letting the country itself decide where to invest it, rather than the EU
deciding which regions within a country deserve support (an argument paying
respect to the subsidiarity principle). Second, the current regional focus may
result in treating unequally, because of different regional imbalances, countries
with otherwise similar levels of wealth (de la Fuente, 2001). Third, EU cohesion
and structural policy is only a part (often, relatively small) of the regional (or
sectoral) policy pursued at the national level using domestic funds. Fourth,
enlargement will vastly increase national income disparities, but not regional
income disparities. Furthermore in the process of national income convergence
an increase of the regional income imbalances is inevitable: it could be
accommodated, but not impeded. Leaving to the countries, rather than to the
regions, the task of deciding how to use EU funds would ensure greater
coherence of the EU and national intervention and it would avoid the perverse
implication of subsidising those countries whose national regional policy are
less effective. The on the ground management and use of the funds can
obviously be made at the regional level.
The distinction between Convergence Aid and Restructuring Aid is
important to assess the relevance of these arguments. A country focus appears
preferable in the case of Convergence Aid. This would imply that countries (as
opposed to regions) would decide on the use of funds. Assignment of funds
could still take into account to any chosen degree regional imbalances within a
country (by looking at both mean and dispersion of per-capita income). Instead,
a regional or a sectoral focus still seems justified in the case of Restructuring
Aid, except perhaps for small and very specialised countries.
As for the second issue, earmarking EU funds makes sense only if two
conditions are simultaneously reunited: a) that “Brussels” can effectively assess
the need and monitor the outcome of the EU funds’ use; b) that their “specific
use” is a central piece of a larger EU strategy. Building a high-quality legal and
administrative system appears to meet those two conditions. Indeed, during the
pre-accession period, the EU has gained considerable experience in monitoring
the quality of the national administrations and it had set a number of tools
14
(financial assistance, but also twinning programs between current and future EU
Member States) to improve that quality.
To strengthen the contribution of the convergence funds to EU growth,
the key principle of “conditionality” should be extended to both earmarked and
non-earmarked funds. In particular one could make the disbursement, of a
significant part of the money of the same or of the following financial period,
dependent upon reaching an agreed performance in terms of results of the use of
funds.18 Conditionality has also an added benefit from a political economy
viewpoint as imposing conditions on the use of resources may reassure countries
which are net contributors to the EU budget. This argument may gain strength in
an enlarged Europe.
Stabilisation
EMU raises the issue of cyclical stabilisation in the event of asymmetric shocks.
Federations around the world typically have a large central budget and
stabilisers, which automatically smooth idiosyncratic shocks. In principle, local
budgets are subject to balance requirements and lending restriction while the
federal budget is less so. The EU fiscal rules have an opposite logic. They imply
that stabilisation is carried out at the national level: countries should bring their
budgets “close to balance or in surplus” in normal times so as to have sufficient
room for manoeuvre to absorb negative shocks without infringing the 3% of
GDP deficit limit19. The Commission has recently stressed the importance to
assess the medium term deficits targets in structural, rather than nominal terms
(European Commission, 2002b). This is consistent with the absence of
centralised stabilisation.
While shock-absorption via national budgets will remain the norm in
EMU, there is the question of risk sharing in the event of large idiosyncratic
shocks. In such a case, a response by the EU budget could be welfare-enhancing.
As either the setting of EU automatic stabilisers20 or the possibility for the EU
budget to run deficits or surpluses appear politically unfeasible, two options
remain: an insurance instrument triggered by asymmetric disturbances (Italianer
and Vanheukelen, 1993) or the possibility of raising funds in the market by the
EU (extra-budget) and transferring them to the Member country hit by the
shock. The first option could be accommodated by creating a single, but
                                                         
18 This would improve over the current mechanism of the “performance reserve” which
triggers a 4% increase of the funds in case of good performance.
19 See, Brunila, Buti and Franco (2001).
20 For instance, von Hagen (2002) has suggested that minimum unemployment benefits for a
limited period (say six months) could be paid by the EU. An idea along similar lines was first
put forward in the Marjolin report in the 1970s (European Commission, 1975).
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“universal” reserve which could be used for stabilisation as well as other
purposes. Such a reserve could be mobilised by the Commission via automatic
rules, without passing through a cumbersome procedure, and possibly
replenishing the reserve during the year by unused commitments21 22. An
argument in favour of the second option is the fact that large country-specific
shocks are rare and thus such a facility would be seldom activated.
Summing up
The conceptual framework laid out in section 2 allows us to summarise the
challenges faced in re-thinking the attribution of allocative tasks between the EU
and the national budgets. The approach put forward amounts to “endogeneise”
the size of the EU budget so as to allow, in the steady state, to minimise the total
amount of public spending (national plus EU) for a given level of output.
Figure 4 illustrates the overall budget constraint (EU plus national
spending) as the 45° straight line. The production schedules are the curves23
going through EB in the case of higher efficiency of EU spending and the line
going through EC in the case of higher efficiency of national spending.
                                                         
21 As a precedent, for the first time in August 2002, following the flooding in Central Europe
(especially the Czech Republic and Germany), the resources for the emergency funds have
been taken from the unused commitments for the structural policy.
22 However, the literature has pointed out that, even leaving aside political and moral hazard
constraints, constructing such an automatic mechanism is not easy. See, e.g. von Hagen and
Hammond (1996).
23 For those policies where optimal production takes place fully at the national level or at the
EU level, the outcome would be either a move towards total re-nationalisation or a move
towards total centralisation at the EU level.
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Figure 4: From the current to the future apportioning of spending across
government levels
According to the analysis in the previous section, the CAP should move from E
towards C, implying a gradual re-nationalisation of agricultural policy, coupled
with, in perspective, a lower support to the sector (shift to a lower level of Y).
External aid, defence and internal security would be shifted along the EA line,
representing a move from national to EU financing and, for some of the items,
entailing also an overall rise in public spending. In line with the Lisbon strategy
R&D, Trans-European Networks (TENs), European citizens’ programmes (such
as the Erasmus programme) and major innovation projects, would move from E
towards B or A. Finally, most of the so-called “other internal policies” in the
current EU budget covering a host of smaller programmes would probably have
to shift from E to D or C.
Redistribution programs across countries are correctly undertaken at the
EU level, that means along the Y-axis. Whether the “intensity” level should be at
R1 or R2 is a political rather than a technical choice. As to stabilisation, no
centralised tool has been designed at the EU level and political constraints make
any change unlikely in the foreseeable future.
3.1 Re-orienting EU revenues
This paper deals mainly with the expenditure side of the EU budget. It pleads for
a reassessment of the functions of the EU Budget according to the generated
added value of the EU and National expenditure. In other words it looks at the
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contribution of the EU expenditure to the EU aims rather than at the accounting
logic of the juste retour.
Both the European Commission and the academia have indicated that the
current system of financing the EU budget is imperfect in several respects,
namely, with respect to transparency, accountability vis-à-vis the EU citizens
and citizens’ perception of the financial autonomy of the EU institutions from
Member States.24 By 2006, some 90%25. of the EU budget will be financed by
national contributions linked to the GNP of any Member State and only the
remaining 10% by direct levies on citizens. The GNP contribution, while having
other positive facets, is at the root of the debate on the juste retour: this debate
hampers a genuine discussion on the added value of any EU expenditure to
emerge. Therefore, if the expenditure side of the EU budget should evolve
accordingly to the principles outlined above, the revenue side should also evolve
consistently with them. This means that, while preserving the principle of the
budgetary equilibrium, those sources of funds having an obvious national
identification (such as the GNP contributions) should be reduced in favour of
new sources of funds having a natural EU base. Natural EU taxes are those
sources of funds that have a clear rational to accrue to the EU budget because
their existence depends on EU policies and that display a clear mismatch in the
geographical pattern of tax collection and tax burden. That is the case, for
example, with the profits of the ECB, which exist only because EMU exists and
whose current national re-apportioning is, from an economic standpoint,
debatable26. That is also the case for other taxes, such as savings taxes, corporate
taxes, stock exchange taxes, environmental taxes etc. Each of these taxes is
suitable to a different degree depending on the different level of harmonisation
of the tax base. The size of the EU budget is so small that even a very partial
accruing to the EU budget of one or more of the mentioned taxes would suffice
to cover the financing needs. Further economic integration, in particular post-
enlargement, is likely to only increase the number of natural EU taxes that could
accrue (partially or totally) to the EU budget.
4. INCREASING THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE EU BUDGET
Looking at the EU budget in an historic perspective one observes, at the end of
the 1980s, a change in the regularity of revenues and expenditure. Since 1988,
the “budgetary peace” between the Commission, the Council and the European
                                                         
24 See European Commission (2002c), section 1.4., Goulard and Nava (2002) and Tabellini
(2003).
25 GNP contributions plus that part of the VAT contributions calculated via the GNP keys.
26 Article 33 of the ECB’s Statute provides for a transfer from the ECB to the national central
banks using a key equal to the arithmetic average of population and GNP (Article 29 of the
Statute). This is subject of much controversy, see H.W. Sinn and H. Feist (2001), J. Murray
Brown (2001) and European Central Bank (2001).
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Parliament, the three institutions involved in the EU budget procedure, increased
markedly27. This improvement in stability has gone hand in hand, however, with
a reduction in the flexibility of the EU budget and an increase of the complexity
of the rules governing it.28
There is a clear and well-understood trade off between resources stability
and financial peace, on the one hand, and margin of manoeuvre or flexibility, on
the other hand. In 1988, with the adoption of the so-called Delors I package,
which instituted the first Financial Perspectives (FP), a political choice had been
made in favour of the former. The FP set every seven years the ceilings for all
budgetary headings and for certain subheadings. Once the FP are set, Member
States have historically displayed stiff reluctance to shift resources across years
and headings. At present, moving unused resources, even within the annual
budgetary procedure, from one to the other budgetary heading (or even sub-
heading), is difficult if not impossible altogether.
In the medium to long run, both the EU budget and the national budgets
have to respect similar constraints in terms of deficits. The EU budget is subject
to the strict requirement of equilibrium laid down in Art. 269 TEC29, while
national budgets are subject to the medium term target of “close to balance or in
surplus” of the Stability and Growth Pact. The difference between the two
conditions boils down to the fact that the EU budget must always be balanced in
each and every year, while national budgets have to be broadly balanced over
the cycle thus allowing for deficits (up to 3% of the GDP) to appear in recession
years and surpluses in boom years.
A political choice in favour of stability at the expense of flexibility is not
dissimilar from the one characterising EMU. In the run up to and in the early
years of EMU, the trade-off between stability and flexibility of national finances
was firmly resolved in favour of the former. Recently, however the Commission
has moved in the direction of taking account of flexibility (European
Commission, 2002b) by accepting that countries with sound public finances (i.e.
low stock of public debt, low implicit liabilities) could run small structural
deficits without violating the requirements of the Pact. There is some ground to
argue that a similar move should be undertaken in the EU finances.
                                                         
27 Since 1988 the EU budget has always been adopted on time and complaints to the Court of
Justice by one or the other Institutions have nearly disappeared. In the period 1975-1988,
preceding the FP, the adoption of the EU budget was delayed in 6 years out of 13 and the EU
institutions complaint to the Court of Justice on 3 occasions.
28 For a lucid overview of the issue of flexibility in the EU Budget, see Montagnon (2002).
29 The European Convention seems oriented to respect both the spirit and the letter of this
article (see Art. 39 of European Convention, 2002).
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In sum, while the FP have helped ensure an orderly development of
budgetary expenditure of the EU budget and guaranteed budgetary peace for the
EU, it is increasingly evident that the current degree of flexibility is not
compatible with the functions of a modern budget and does not permit the EU
budget to react timely to changing circumstances. A higher flexibility is a pre-
condition to move to a truly European Budgetary System, as proposed below.
5. DESIGNING A EUROPEAN BUDGETARY SYSTEM
Rethinking the EU budgetary arrangements goes beyond rethinking at which
level individual policies should be carried out and how to conduct an EU fiscal
policy under the straitjacket of excessive rigidity and small and predetermined
size. The basic tenet of this paper is that introducing vertical coordination
between the EU and national budgets can help to address the fiscal failures
identified above.
So far, the EU and national levels have remained separate. As exemplified
in the top part of Figure 4, fiscal policy in the EU is the outcome of two non-
coordinated sets of instruments: on the one hand the EU budget and on the other
hand the national budgets of the 15 Member States30.
                                                         
30 According to the Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, of
December 2002, the EU members are set to become 25 from May 1st, 2004, and 27 from the
year 2007.
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Figure 5: Towards a European Budgetary System
Current Budgetary System
Multiannual  Annual  
Proposed “European Budgetary System”
Multiannual  
European  budgetary program
Annual  
New BEPGs
Financial Perspectives EU Budget
National Stability
Programmes National Budget Laws
EU-Financial Perspectives
National stability
programmes
EU-Budget law
National budget laws
However, as the EU moves towards stronger fiscal policy co-ordination, such
separation needs to be overcome. This has potentially profound implications for
both the annual budget and the multi-annual FP.
The bottom part of Figure 4 shows how a coherent EU budgetary system,
which puts the EU budget in line with the national budgets could be articulated.
The EU budget is to be looked at as centralised (at EU level) fiscal policy
subject to decentralised national constraints (EU budgetary resources are
essentially Member States’ contributions). National budgets are to be looked at
as a decentralised system of fiscal policy subject to centralised EU constraints
(the Stability and Growth Pact and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines,
BEPGs).
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In a medium term framework (covering a time span of, say, five years),
EU policy makers should elaborate an aggregate European Stability Programme
which sets the spending priorities for the Union and the Member States31. It
would also decide how to allocate spending on individual items between the EU
and the Member States. The national Stability Programmes and a new EU-level
Stability Programme – which would replace the current FP - would translate the
common objectives into concrete medium term spending programmes. The
provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact – namely the medium term target of
“close to balance or in surplus” and the 3% of GDP deficit ceiling – will
continue to apply to all EU countries.
The aggregate Stability Programme as well as its national and EU
components would be rolled over and updated annually. This would mark a
fundamental change compared to the existing situation where each national
stability programme is decided on an individual basis and the FP are set every
seven years and are fixed within such a period.
A similar process would take place on an annual basis. The EU budget
and national budgets should form a coherent set, adhering to the strategic
objectives of the BEPGs (see Table 1 on the links between the BEPGs and the
EU budget). This should be included in the “New BEPGs”, which should
contain both recommendations for the EU level policies and, country tailored,
recommendations on national priorities. As mentioned in section 2.1, given the
relatively high decision-making costs (ex-ante) and frustration costs (ex-post), at
the EU level, the annual process should mainly focus on fine tuning multi-
annual priorities.
The upshot is that Member States and EU institutions would decide
together how to translate their common policy priorities into global budgetary
commitments and how these commitments are shared between the national and
the EU levels. This implies building vertical links between the EU and the
national budgets. Clearly, fiscal discipline will need to be upheld: the
reconsideration of the distribution across jurisdictions should not imply an
overall increase in spending. In the past, the stress on the contradiction between
                                                         
31 This paper focuses mainly on allocative policies. A proposal for a budgetary coordination
mechanism putting the emphasis on stabilisation was submitted by the then French Finance
Minister, Dominique Strauss-Khan, at the informal Ecofin Council in Dresden in April 1999.
The French proposal stressed that the aggregate policy stance at the EMU level must be
examined on the basis of an aggregate stability programme. The proposal pointed out that the
objective to achieve an adequate policy stance for the EMU as a whole should be taken into
account when examining the national stability programmes. For a discussion, see Buti et al.
(2003). A similar proposal has been presented recently by the vice-president of the EU
Convention, Giuliano Amato, see Amato (2002). On similar lines, see Collignon (2002) and
Majocchi (2002).
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(Maastricht-induced) national prudence and alleged EU “largesse” has
underpinned the refusal to reconsider EU budgetary responsibilities. However,
as we move towards a EU budgetary system, such reluctance should be
overcome. Such reassessment would not necessarily imply a substantial rise in
the EU budget. As we pointed out in section 3, a rise in spending in certain areas
would go hand in hand with a reduction in others. What this new approach
would bring is a better efficiency: to the extent that the existing distribution of
spending between the national and the EU level is not optimal, the net effect
would be a decrease in overall public expenditure.32
A couple of examples would help clarify this general statement. In
September 2002 at the Johannesburg Summit on sustainable development,
Heads of State and Government have agreed to pledge 0.7% of each country’s
GDP for development aid. The higher potential effectiveness of a centralised
management of these resources calls for the assignment of such intervention
prevalently at the EU level. The Lisbon growth strategy sets a target of investing
3% of EU GDP in R&D in order to foster competitiveness. Criteria of efficiency
and effectiveness should be the base for the split between private and public
spending, and, within the latter, between national level and the EU level. It
makes sense, for instance, to carry out large research and innovation projects
directly at the EU level.
The 2001 BEPGs showed an opening in this direction: “Just like the
Member States, the Community should apply strict budgetary discipline. This
must be applied to all categories of the Financial perspectives, while respecting
the inter-institutional agreement on budget discipline and the improvement of the
budget procedure; a flexible allocation of Community resources should be
exploited in order to enhance the economic impact of the EU Budget”.(emphasis
added). The Commission Communication on economic policy coordination of
February 2001 (European Commission, 2001) states that “the establishment of
guidelines and priorities in the EU budget should be embedded in a global vision
encompassing both the guidelines and priorities in the budgets of the Member
States and the criteria established in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines in
order to enable Member States to take them into account in their budget laws”.33
                                                         
32 We show in Annex, that, under certain circumstances, the current budgetary arrangements
imply a higher overall spending and a lower supply of public goods than what would be
implied by the optimal allocation of spending between the two levels of government.
33 An even more ambitious objective would be to discuss, when establishing the priorities in
the EU budget, also those policies, which have little financial impact for the EU budget, but a
great financial impact on national budgets (ex. Community fiscal directives, environmental
directives, etc). This would allow national policy-makers to take account of community inputs
and embody them into their national policies. Von Hagen (2002) strongly supports the view
of making “law making” compatible with “money spending” and more generally of assessing
the financial impact, for the EU system, of “law making”.
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Table 1: The BEPGs and the EU budget
Priority BEPG 2002 Budget item (B-2002, adopted by
the EP on 13/12/01)
1 Accelerate reforms in the network
industries
B2-7 (Transport)
B5-7 (Trans-European Networks)
2 Promote the quality of public
expenditure by redirecting funds
towards physical capital
B2-1-0 (Structural Funds:
Objective 1)
3 Enhance environmental
sustainability
B4-3 (Environment)
B6 (Research and technological
Development)
4 Investments in human capital, R&D
and ICT
B2-1-2 (Structural Funds:
Objective 3)
B6 (Research and technological
Development)
5 Active labour market policies and
lifelong learning
B2-1-2 (Structural Funds:
Objective 3)
B3-1 (Education, vocational
training and youth)
B3-4 (Social dimension and
Employment)
B5-3-2 (Internal Market: Promotion
of growth and employment:
measures to assist firms)
B5-5 (Labour market and
technological innovation);
6 Encourage entrepreneurship by
improving access to finance
especially for SMEs
B5-5 (Labour market and
technological innovation)
6. A “EU BUDGET LAW”
Consistently with the European Stability Programme, the annual EU budget
should become a true “EU Budget Law”. In order to achieve this aim, the
current budgetary procedure (budget proposal, approval and implementation)
would have to be overhauled.34 This would be possible only if a balance of
“sticks and carrots” is found to avoid conflicts among the Commission, the
Council and the European Parliament (the last two being the two arms of the EU
“budgetary authority”).
                                                         
34 The draft skeleton for the European Constitution (European convention 2002) has an article
(Art. 40) specifically dealing with budgetary procedure for the EU budget adoption.
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Table 2 spells out the differences between the current budgetary procedure
and our proposal.
Phase 0: Multi-annual planning
Currently, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission and subject to
the majority approval in the European Parliament, fixes the FP which are then
enshrined in the Inter Institutional Agreement. The FP establish the maximum
expenditure per annum, per budgetary heading and in certain cases per
budgetary sub-heading (e.g. Cohesion and structural funds within the Structural
action heading).
In its second Communication to the Convention (European Commission,
2002c), the Commission has proposed that FP are adopted in co-decision
between the Council and the European Parliament and that “(t)he Convention
will have to look into the question of associating the national parliaments in this
decision”. This goes in the direction we suggest. The multi-annual planning of
the EU should be in tune with national planning. Instead of being fixed for seven
years, the FP would be rolling and linked with the BEPGs within a European
Stability Programme.
Phase 1: Budget proposal
Currently, this phase covers Internal (to the Commission) Budgetary Hearings.
The Commission makes the arbitrages of the expenditure claims across its own
departments while making sure that FP are respected. Before completing the
draft budget the Council, Commission and Parliament hold a trilogue. By the
end of April, the Commission submits the draft budget for the following year to
the Budgetary Authority (Council and Parliament).
According to our proposal, the current budgetary hearings phase should
be "de-technicised" and "opened to the outside". This phase could become a
political phase in tune with the debate taking place at the national level.
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The Commission would present (end January/early February), at a Jumbo
Council (Ecofin plus Budget Councils) and the European Parliament, its
budgetary proposal for the following year and listen to national priorities and to
the national intentions for the different policies35. Budgetary hearings cease to
be only internal, but become external, and more political, in order to coordinate
EU budget and national political priorities. Following the Jumbo Council,
individual Commissioners would go to specialised Councils to present the
Commission’s budget proposals. Commissioners and national ministers would
check the coherence of their strategies – in line with the BEPG – and undertake
to modify the initial proposal to achieve an overall consistent policy.
The Commission remains the last authority in the drafting phase and, as
such, must ensure consistency between EU budget and national budgets. The
Council and the European Parliament, however, would get involved in a phase
where their role is, so far, null.
Phase 2: Budget approval
Currently, the Council and European Parliament, in their capacity of budgetary
authority, go through the first reading of the Budget (approximately by
September) and the second reading (between September and December). The
Parliament finally adopts the Budget in December. There is no formal role for
the Commission during this phase.36 This has facilitated the task of several
lobbies attempting to influence the Parliament’s rapporteurs to modify the
appropriations of specific budget lines, with the result, in most cases, of
increasing the proliferation of small programmes, entailing a misallocation of
resources and reducing the overall coherence of the budget.
In our proposal, while the Council and the European Parliament would
remain the last authorities, the Commission would play an active role, in
particular making sure that, during the first and second readings, the consistency
between the EU and the national budgets is maintained.
Phase 3: Budget implementation and reporting
At present article 274 lays down that “(t)he Commission executes the Budget
under its own responsibility”. This has been criticised namely because, in
economic terms, it does not always seem justified and in political terms it seems
at odds with subsidiarity. If convergence policy would be implemented via
                                                         
35 If the more ambitious approach mentioned in footnote 33 is chosen, the Commission may
also be expected to discuss those regulatory policies that have an impact on national budgets.
36 However, on average the changes with respect to the draft budget are minute (often less
than 1% of the total budget, in 2003 0.32%).
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(conditional) block grants rather than the current earmarked funds, this legal
provision would need to be changed in favour of joint responsibility of the
Commission and the member states in executing the budget. Currently, the
Commission implements the budget, but has a limited autonomous political role
to play, even in the event of re-allocation of the under-spending.
In our proposal, a parallel between the Commission and the EU Member
States would need also to be established in terms of reporting. Currently
Member States make their notifications known in March of each year (for the
budget implementation of the previous year) and in September (for the budget
implementation of the same year). A similar reporting should be established for
the EU budget and an overall report should be sent to the Council and the
European Parliament. Going beyond the purely financial dimension, the
Implementation Report of the BEPG issued every February should be extended
to the EU budget and policies. Finally, a critical issue is that of the mobilisation
of unused resources, in co-ordination with programmes and priorities of
Member States.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Due to its small size, historically-determined rather than priority-oriented
composition and lack of flexibility, the EU budget plays a modest role in the
economic policy of the EU and the euro area. This translates into the fact that, at
the central level, the EU is left, de facto, without one of the most powerful
instruments of economic governance, the budget. Some take the view that this is
because the EU budget is bent to satisfy national requests and nothing should be
substantially changed otherwise the whole “EU political equilibrium” would
collapse. On the contrary, we have taken the “benevolent” view that one can
improve upon the design and the structure of the EU budget.
The basic tenet of this paper is that, as the EU moves towards a higher
level of integration, it needs a more consistent system of public finances which
encompasses both national and EU budgets. We propose to move towards a
truly European Budgetary System where EU and national budgetary processes
are closely aligned and an effective vertical coordination occurs in areas of
common intervention. Implementation of this proposal would not require any
change in the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. “Endogenising” the
amount of public spending carried out at the EU level would help reduce the
political controversies surrounding the size of the EU budget.
The main objective of this proposal is to move towards EU’s economic
governance where the community and national levels play together. The role of
the EU budget would be valorised in crescendo with EU fiscal surveillance
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which is currently being extended from “below the line” (budget balances) to
“above the line” (single items of expenditure and revenues), with a growing
emphasis on the quality of public finances (European Commission, 2000,
2002a).
It goes without saying that several aspects of the proposed system and its
functioning need further reflection. For instance, it remains to be seen whether
the aggregate stability programme and, a fortiori, the EU-level stability
programme, should encompass non-euro area countries. Second, in order to
make this proposal viable, one should study how to contain the transaction costs
involved by the horizontal and vertical coordination processes. Third, in order to
function effectively, the system would require some synchronisation of
budgetary procedures at the different levels of government (including regional
ones in some Member States). An interesting idea initially put forward by
Jacques Delors (see Pisani-Ferry and Jacquet, 2001) is to separate the budgetary
calendar between a first ‘EU semester’, in which EU priorities would be defined,
and a ‘national semester’, in which such priorities are tailored to the national
level. These and other issues deserve further scrutiny.
Marco.Buti@cec.eu.int
Mario.Nava@cec.eu.int
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ANNEX: THE DISTRIBUTION OF SPENDING BETWEEN NATIONAL
AND EU BUDGET UNDER POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS: A SIMPLE
MODEL
In the present circumstances, the decisions on how to allocate spending between
national and EU budget are completely separated. Given the current institutional
constraints, EU spending is practically fixed. At the national level, fiscal
discipline and political economy constraints make it costly to depart from the
existing level of public spending.
In order to model the financing of a desired level of public good or
service, we assume a linear "production function":
(1) EUGNGY 
Where NG is national spending, EUG  is community spending and  and   are
their respective productivity.
As pointed out in the text, such a production function gives rise to corner
solutions: if spending can be freely allocated between the EU and the national
level, the whole financing would take place either at EU level (if ) or at the
national level (if ). We assume however that political or institutional
constraints make it costly to move away from some EU and national spending
levels (indicated below by NG  and EUG ) which are dictated by
political/institutional constraints.
In order to capture these constraints, we assume the following loss
function:
 (5) 222* )()()( EUEUNN GGGGYYL  
Where *Y is the desired level of output.
Minimising (5) with respect to NG and EUG  yields:
 (6) 
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YGG)(
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
The relationship between NG and EUG is represented in Figure A.1. A fall in
NG , leads to a rise in EUG and a higher *Y  implies a rise in both spending. A
fall in   leads to a rise in both EUG and NG .
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As expected, a higher and more productive EU spending leads to a lower
national spending37.
Figure A1: EU and national spending under political constraints
One can take the current situation as implying very high values of , implying
that EUG = EUG .
38 If the EU moves to a truly "budgetary system", the constraints
on NG and EUG will be lifted and the choice of financing will depend on the
relative efficiency of each type of spending. Nevertheless, in the transition, the
existing constraints may still play a role. The transition can be thought of as a
gradual reduction in the value of  and , with the former which is very high
today, coming down at a higher pace, together with a departure from the initial
objectives of GEU and GN.
For analytical convenience, it is useful to take as a benchmark the case in
which the desired level of output is equal or higher than that produced by
allocating the total desired level of spending to the most efficient level of
government. Formally: *Y  G  if  or *Y  G  if <.
                                                         
37 However, the resulting level of output will correspond to the desired level only if *YY  ,
where Y = EUN GG  .
38 If so, the level of national spending becomes: (8) 


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E
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Under such an assumption, and assuming that the current level of Y is
lower than Y*, it is easy to show that the current total level of spending is larger
and the output is lower than the final equilibrium. Under < this occurs
because, in order to shift Y towards Y*, GN is set higher than NG  even though it
is less productive than GEU. On the contrary, , the desired increase in GN is
not compensated by a corresponding reduction in GEU. As pictured in Figures
A.2 and A.3 (under the case of Y*= GEU and Y*=GN, respectively), the
offsetting reduction in the least productive spending only takes place over time
as the constraints on  and  are reduced. In the final equilibrium, the desired
level of output is wholly financed via the most efficient spending.
Figure A2: More efficient EU spending
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Figure A3: More efficient national spending
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